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DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP AS
APPLIED TO CORPORATIONS
LAWRENCE

F.

DALY*

D

URING the last session of Congress, and for several preceding
sessions, the American public has heard vague rumors of certain
contemplated changes in the Judicial Code with reference to the removal of causes of action to the federal courts on the basis of the
diversity of citizenship of the litigants. On closer study, we find the
American Bar Association arrayed against these proposed changes,
seemingly not because of any well-weighed conclusions as to the relative merits of these changes but because of the fact that the Association was not given adequate notice. This opposition is no indication
that the bill is without merit but is, rather, a protest against the Senate
Judiciary Committee's action in attempting so great a change of federal
jurisdiction without first having given the Bar Association an opportunity for a hearing of objections. It is interesting to note at this point,
that the author of this proposed legislation was also the sponsor of the
now notorious Caraway bill, which would have taken from the federal
judges the power to weigh and interpret the facts for the jury. This
last proposal has met almost unanimous opposition and has been characterized by learned writers as being "utterly vicious."' Senator Norris's sponsorship of the Caraway bill has undoubtedly been responsible
for much of the unstudied criticism of his proposed amendment for
the abolition of the jurisdiction of the federal courts based upon the
diversity of citizenship of the litigants.
Although the proposed Norris changes are startling, they are not
altogether new for numerous authorities have long urged that the right
to sue or be sued in the federal courts be denied to corporations.2 The
federal courts have refused to so deny that right but the theory upon
which the court has held the corporation to be a proper party in federal
court has not only been varied but too frequently entirely illogical.'
Since a corporation has an individuality separate from that of the
members who compose it, and since it is regarded for many purposes
as a distinct person having many of the rights, and being subject to
many of the liabilities of natural persons, it is important to determine
* Professor of Law, De Paul University.
131 H.L.R. 1011.
2 Frankfurter, "Distribution of Judicial Power Between U.S. and State Courts."
1928. 13 Corn. L. Quar. 499.
3 'arren,

"New Light on the History of the Federal judiciary Act of 1789."

(1923) 37 H.L.R. 49-89.
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the residence or citizenship of corporations. This question has generally
arisen in connection with the jurisdiction of suits by and against corporations in the federal courts.
The term "citizen" as it is commonly understood implies membership of a political body, and therefore does not ordinarily include corporations. Accordingly corporations are not citizens of the states of
their creation within the meaning of Article IV, Sec. 2 of the Federal
Constitution which provides that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states 4 or of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that "no
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the U. S.' But corporations are regarded as citizens "within the provision of Article III., section 2, conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts of cases between citizens of
different states, in such a sense that diversity of citizenship may give
the federal courts jurisdiction of the suit.6 With reference to the construction placed upon the present day attitude of our courts as to the
theory of the citizenship of corporations, it is interesting to follow the
transitions which have taken place since John Marshall's interpretation in the celebrated case, Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61. In
this case Marshall held that a corporation could not come into a federal
court except through the actual citizenship of its members. "The changing course of the decisions after this case until such times as the corporations' place in the federal courts was fully established, is significantly
co-incident with the economic development of this country." 7 Corporations during the past fifty years have undergone many fundamental
changes which have necessitated the modified views of the courts.
The Deveaux case established a definition for the term "citizen"
and its application as used in the federal courts. The Bank of Augusta
v. Earle case, 13 Peter (U.S.) 519, was the next important milestone
in that series of federal decisions which although departing from the
reasoning of the Deveaux case managed to arrive at the same conclusion. This was but the beginning of inconsistent judicial legislation
4

U.S.Bank v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 3 U.S. (L. Ed.) 38; Augusta Bank v.
Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 U.S. (L: Ed.) 274; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19

U.S. (L. Ed.) 357.
•Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 43 U.S. (L. Ed.) 552.
6Louisville C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (U.S.) 497, 11 U.S. (L. Ed.)
353; Marshall v. Baltimore, & Ohio R. Co. 16 How. 314. "A corporation can
have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which

it was created." (Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 519, 10 U.S.
(L. Ed.) 274; Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 36 U.S. (L. Ed.) 768.

7See Henderson "Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional
Law," 60, 61.
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which ultimately resulted in giving corporations the maximum amount
of protection from sectional and local prejudice, by virtue of the
manipulation of the meaning of the word "citizen." In a case 8 decided
thirty-five years after Marshall's decision, the Supreme Court of the
United States said: "A corporation created by a state to perform its
functions under the authority of that state, and only suable there,
though it may have.members out of the state, seems to -us to be a per:son, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging t6 that state, and
therefore entitled, for the purposes of suing and being sued, to be
deemed a citizen of that state." The court in going further said '"We
remark, too, that the cases of Strawbridge v. Curtis, (3 Cranch'[U.S,]
267) and the Bank v. Deveaux have never -been satisfactory to the
bar, and that they were not, especially the last, entirely' satisfactory to
the court that made them. They have been followed always most reluctantly and with dissatisfaction. * .'-*We think we may safely assert,

that a majority of the members of this court have at all times partaken
of the same regret; and that whenever a case has occurred 'on the circuit, involving the application of the case of the Bank v.- Deveaux, it
was yielded to, because the decision'had been made, and- not because
it was thought to be right." 9
Strictly speaking, a corporation is not a citizen within the federal
Constitution; and it may be of interest to point out here that nowhere
in the Constitution is there to be found any grant of express authority
for extending the judicial power of the United States to actions against
corporations of the different states, -unless corporations are to be included in the term "citizen" in the clause giving to the federal government jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different
states. For the purpose of jurisdiction over suits between citizens of
different states a corporation "is to be regarded as if it were a citizen
of the state where it was created."' 10 This result of citizenship was
reached in either of two ways-regarding the corporation as "capable
of being treated as a citizen of the state, as much as a natural person," 1" or else through the assumption that for purposes of suit the
citizenship of the incorporators is that of the state creating the corporation. Originally this presumption of citizenship followed upon allegation and proof that all of the stockholders were citizens of a certain
5

Louisville C & C. R. Co. v. Letson, supra.

9 For a history of this controversy see 1 Va. L. Rev. 507; 56 Am. L. Rev. 88.
10 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 65, 20 U.S. (L. Ed.) 354;
Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black (U.S.) 297, 17 U.S. (L. Ed.) 130;
Louisville C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (U.S.) 497, 11 U.S. (L. Ed.)
353. See Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (U.S.) 61, 3 U.S. (L. Ed.) 38.
"1Louisville C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson (supra) ; Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S.
579, 49 U.S. (L. Ed.) 606.
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state.12 Sometime later, however, our present day rule was established,
namely that a suit, brought by or against a corporation "is regarded as
a suit brought by or against the stockholders of the corporation; and,
for the purposes of jurisdiction, it is conclusively presumed that the
stockholders are citizens of the state which, by its laws, created the
corporation."' 13 In Pacific R. R. Co. v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., (23
Fed. 565) the court said: "Strictly speaking, corporations cannot be
citizens; and therefore, in order to hold them amenable to the federal
jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship, it has been found necessary
to assume, often contrary to the fact, that all of the stockholders are
citizens of the state by which the corporation was created. It is only
by virtue of this assumption that a. corporation can be said to be a
citizen .of any state. The.presumption that all the stockholders are citizens of the state under whose laws they incorporate is a conclusive
presumption, and the fact will not be inquired into. The fact may be
that not one of the stockholders in a citizen of such state; but if so, it
cannot be made to appear. The place of transacting business cuts no
figure. The corporation, for judicial purposes, is a citizen of the state
by which it-was created, even if all its business is transacted elsewhere,
and all of its offices and places of business are outside of the state."
And in Thomas v. Ohio State University, (195 U.S. 207, 49 U.S. [L.
Ed.] 160) it was held that this presumption of citizenship of the members of the corporation was "so firmly established that further discussion of it would be both useless and inappropriate."
This presumption, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, that the
members of a corporation are citizens of the state which created it, will
not however defeat federal jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of
citizenship where the controversy has arisen between a corporation
and one of its stockholders. There is no legal presumption in such a
case that the complainant, merely because of his being a stockholder
in the corporation, is a citizen of the same state as the corporation.",
Mr. justice McKenna, in-Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 49 L.
Ed. 606, said: "The reason of the presumption (we will so denominate
12 Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, supra; Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch

(U.S.) 57, 3 U.S. (L. Ed.) 36.
'3lMiller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, U.S. (L. Ed.) 207; Doctor v. Harrington, 196

U.S. 579, 49 U.S. (L. Ed.) 606; Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 42
U.S. (L. Ed.) 964; U.S. v. Northwestern Express, Stage v. Transportation
Co., 164 U.S. 686, 41 U.S. (L. Ed.) 599; Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co. 145 U.S.
444, 36 U.S. (L. Ed.) 768; National S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 27
U.S. (L. Ed.) 87; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall, (U.S.) 65, 20
U.S. (L. Ed.) 354; Ohio & 3%. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black (U.S.) 286, 17
U.S. (L. Ed.) 130.
14 Hanchett v. Blair, 100 Fed. 817.
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it) was to establish the citizenship of the legal entity for the purpose
of jurisdiction in the federal courts. Before its adoption difficulties had
been encountered on account of the conditions under which jurisdiction
was given to those courts. A corporation is constituted, it is true, of all
its stockholders, but it has a legal existence separate from themrights and obligations separate from them; and may have obligations
to them. It can sue and be sued. At first this could be done in the Circuit Court of the United States only when. the corporation was composed of citizens of the state which created it. Bank of the U.S. v.
Deveaux; Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman. But the limitation came to be
seen as almost a denial of jurisdiction to or against corporations in
the federal courts, and in Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, prior
cases were reviewed; and this doctrine laid down: "That a corporation
created by and doing business in a particular state is to be deemed to
all intents and purposes as a persons, although an artificial person,
* * * capable as being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a
natural person. * * * The presumption that the citizenship of the
corporators should be that of the domicile of the corporation was not
then formulated. That came afterwards, and overcame the difficulty
and objection that the legal creation, the corporation, could not be a
citizen within the meaning of the Constitution. Marshall v. Baltimore
& 0. R. Co., 16 How. (U.S.) 314. This, then, was its purpose, and to
stretch beyond this is to stretch it to wrong. It is one thing to give a
corporation a status, and another thing to take away from a citizen the
right given him by the Constitution of the United States."
It may readily be seen that in spite of the difference of opinion of
the various justices, a majority of them followed, at least in effect, the
idea Sir Henry Maine had when he said that law had to be brought in
harmony with society, and as corporations were increasing progress
demanled that our judicial system reverse itself. A noted writer has
this 5 to say concerning this point: "The constitution gave the citizens
of each state large rights in other states. It was plain that this grant
was never meant- to extend to artificial persons. But how avoid the
effect of the general rule of hermeneutics that a word occurring more
than once in a written instrument shall be taken always in the same
sense, unless the context clearly points to a different construction:"
What was thought the least dangerous method was adopted. The term
"citizen" was given the same meaning whenever found in the Constitution, but at the cost of what has sometimes been stigmatized as a
judicial lie.
All of the matters above discussed are now well-settled. Difficult
15 Baldwin, Amer. Law Review, Vol. XLI, p. 43.
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questions are often presented, however, in determining the citizenship
of a company incorporated in two or more states, of reorganized corporations, of consolidated and merged corporations, and of domesticated corporations. An eminent legal writer' 6 has said that the status
of a company incorporated in more than one jurisdiction is an anomaly
that deserves more scientific treatment than it has yet received. A
corporation being a creature of the law, exists as a distinct entity in
the state of its creation or where the law gives it is franchise. " 'It is
very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the
boundaries o! the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in
contemplation of law, and by force of the law. * * * It must dwell in
the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.
But, although it must live and have its being in that state only, yet it
does not by any means follow that its existence there will not be recognized in other places; and its residence in one state creates no insuperable objection to its power of contracting to another.' This statement
has been often reaffirmed by this court, with some change of phrase,
but always retaining the idea that the legal existence, the home, the
domicil, the habitat, the residence, the citizenship of the corporation
can only be in the state by which it was created, although it may do
business in other states whose laws permit it.'1- While, it is true, a

corporation must dwell in the state of its creation, yet different states
may each grant charters to the same incorporators for the same general business. These estates may by proper legislation each create a corporation within its boundaries, having the same name, the same powers,
the same duties, franchises, and purposes and under one management,
so that for all practical purposes they are operated as one corporation.
But, since the laws of a state can have no extraterritorial effect, from
the very nature of things these states cannot unite to create the same
corporation. The actual result of such legislation is to create a separate
and distinct corporation in each state"" and as a citizen of the state the
corporation has the protection of and is amenable to the laws of that
state. 19 In Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944 the court
said: "Although for some purposes a body incorporated in several
states may be regarded as an entity, it is not so for all. It is likely to
13 H.L.R. 597.
"7Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co. 145 U.S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935, 36 U.S. (L. Ed.) 768.
18 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black (U.S.) 286, 17 U.S. (L. Ed.) 130;
M\issouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753, 30 L.R.A. 250; Miller v. Dows,
94 U.S. 444, 24 U.S. (L. Ed.) 207; Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. R.
Corp., 136 U.S. 356, 34 U.S. '(L. Ed.) 363; Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
16

45 Fed. 812.
19 Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317; Memphis &
C. R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581, 27 U.S. (L. Ed.) 518
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have different attributes in each state arising from different laws which
affect it. It might acquire franchise in one state which it does not
possess in others. An incorporation by one state of the same individuals
is not the adoption of the corporation of another state. These considerations furnish a reason why it is that, where a corporation of a
state is sued in its own courts, regard is had to it only as a creation
of that state for all purposes of jurisdiction. Business enterprises in
which a combination of such corporations may engage, create common
rights, and entail joint liabilities. These, however, concern the activities
of the corporations, and not their essential character. When the idea is
grasped that whenever a corporation is sued in a state by whose laws it
has been created and the question of its citizenship is involved, the
court will regard the corporation intended as defendant as the one
created and existing by the laws of that state, we have the key to the
solution of the inquiry. The laws of the state are the mould in which
the corporation is cast and continues to exist. It derives its faculties
from those laws; and the fact that it may be allowed to exercise
those faculties in another state, however freely or with whatever limitations, does not alter its essential character in the state of its creation.
It is a citizen of that state and no other, whatever privileges it may
there be permitted to enjoy, even though they be identical with those
it enjoys at its home." Therefore, where a company is incorporated by
two or more states, it will be, under the Constitution and laws of the
20
United States, regarded as two separate and distinct corporations,
21
In the case of Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler, the plaintiff maintained
that it was a corporation incorporated by virtue of the laws of the
states of Indiana and Ohio and having its principal place of business
in Ohio. It sued the defendant in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Indiana, describing him as a resident of Indiana.
The Supreme Court of the United States denied jurisdiction on the
basis of diversity of citizenship and said: "It is true that a corporation
by the name and style of the plaintiff appears to have been chartered
by the states of Indiana and Ohio, clothed with the same capacities
and powers, and intended to accomplish the same objects; and it is
spoken of in the laws of the states as one corporate body, exercising
the same powers and fulfilling the same duties in both states. Yet it
has no legal existence in either state, except by the law of the state:
and neither state could confer on it a corporate existence in the other,
nor add to nor diminish the powers to be there exercised. * * * The
20

21

Rece v. Newport News & 'Mississippi Valley Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 9 S.E. 912,
3 L.R.A. 572.
1 Black (U.S.) 286, 17 U.S. (L. Ed.), 130. Also see article 4 Col. L. Rev.
391, "Corporations of Two States," J. H. Beale, Jr.
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president and directors of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company
is, therefore, a distinct and separate corporate body in Indiana from
the corporate body of the same name in Ohio, and they cannot be
joined in a suit as one and the same plaintiff, nor maintain a suit
in that character against a citizen of Ohio or Indiana in a Circuit Court
of the United States." "The only possible status of a company acting
under charters from two states is that it is an association incorporated
in and by each of the states; and, when acting as a corporation in
either of the states, it acts under the authority of the charter of the
state in which it is then acting, and that only, the legislation of the
other state having no operation beyond its territorial limits.

' 22

There-

fore even though the corporation is purporting to act as a single corporation it cannot sue in the federal courts on the ground of diversity of
citizenship of one of the incorporating states.23 nor can the company
remove to the federal courts a suit brought against it in the court of
one of the states in which it was incorporated by a citizen of that
state, on the ground that it is a citizen of another state.2 4 If the plaintiff is a citizen of state A, and the defendant was incorporated in both
state A and state B, there is no diversity of citizenship, because for
the purpose of jurisdiction the defendant will be treated as a corpora25
tion of state A.

Distinction must be made between chartering corporations and
merely granting a license to the corporation to allow that corporation
to do business within the state upon compliance with certain conditions.
In Martin v. B. & 0. R. R., 151 U.S. 673, 38 U.S. (L.Ed.) 311, it was
said: "A railroad corporation, created by the laws of one state, may
carry on business in another, either by virtue of being created a corporation by the laws of the latter state also, as in Railroad Co. v.
Vance, 96 U.S. 450; Memphis & Charleston R. Co. v. Alabama, 107
U.S. 581; and Graham v. Boston, Hartford, & Erie Railroad, 118 U.S.
161; or by virtue of a license, permission or authority granted by the
laws of the latter state to act in that state, under its charter from the
former state. Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; Railroad Co. v.
Koontz, 104 U.S. 6; Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 127 U.S.
117. In the first alternative it cannot remove into the Circuit Court
22 Quincy Railroad Bridge Co. v. Adams Co., 88 Il1. 615. Also Patch v. Wabash
R. Co. 207, U.S. 277, 52 U.S. (L. Ed.) 204; Clark v. Bever, 139 U.S. 96,
35 U.S. (L. Ed.) 88; Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 136 U.S.
356, 34 U.S. (L. Ed.) 363.
23 St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Steele, 167 U.S. 659, 42 U.S. (L. Ed.) 315;

Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753, 30 L.R.A. 250.

24 Patch v. Wabash R. Co. 207 U.S. 277, 52 U.S. (L. Ed.) 204; Home v. Boston
& M. R.R., 18 Fed. 50.
25 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Western Maryland Co. 44 Fed. (2nd) 595.
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of the United States a suit brought against it in a court of the latter
state by a citizen of that state because it is a citizen of the same state
with him. In the second alternative it can remove such a suit because
it is a citizen of a different state from the plaintiff." In Railway Co.
v. James, 161 U.S. 545, the plaintiff, a citizen of Missouri, brought
suit against a corporation of the same state in the federal court of
Arkansas for injuries received in Missouri. The Supreme Court held
that the action must fail for diversity of citizenship, the defendant
having been merely "adopted" in Arkansas with the privileges of a
domestic corporation but not incorporated as such. Mr. Justice Shiras
said: "To fully reconcile all the expressions used in these cases would
be no easy task, but we think the following propositions may be
deducted from them: There is an indisputable legal presumption that
a state corporation, when sued or suing in a federal court, is composed
of citizens of the state which created it, and hence such a corporation
is itself deemed to come within the provision of the Constitution which
confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts in controversies between
citizens of different states. It is competent for a railroad corporation
organized under the laws of one state, when authorized so to do by the
consent of the state which created it, to accept authority from another
state to extend its railroad into such state. * * * We are now asked
to extend the doctrine of indisputable citizenship so that if a corporation of one state, indisputably taken for the purpose of federal jurisdiction to be composed of citizens of such state, is authorized by the
law of another state to do business therein and to be endowed for local
purposes with all the powers and privileges of a domestic corporation,
such adopted corporation shall be deemed to be composed of citizens
of the second state in such a sense as to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts at the suit of a citizen of the state of its original creation.
We are unwilling to sanction such an extention of a doctrine which,
as heretofore established, went to the very verge of judicial power."
The distinction is well illustrated by the case of Baltimore & 0. R. Co.
v. Harris.2" Here the plaintiff had been incorporated under the laws of
Maryland. Later Virginia passed a law in which it was recited: "that
the same rights and privileges shall be, and are hereby, granted to the
aforesaid company within the territory of Virginia, and the said company shall be subject to the same pains, penalties, and obligations as
are imposed by the act ;" * * * The court held in this case that the act

of Virginia was merely to give a license to the Maryland corporation,
and did not in any manner change its status-that it was still a Mary-

26

12 Wall. (U.S.) 65, 20 U.S. (L. Ed.) 354.
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land corporation for the purposes of federal jurisdiction.2 7 But, it
has been held that where a foreign corporation is adopted, the
effect may be to create a domestic corporation. 2 Whether or not the
effect is merely the granting of a license of the creation of a domestic
corporation is one of intention. To make a corporation of one state
"a corporation of another state, the language used must imply creation
or adoption in such form as to confer the power usually exercised over
corporations by the state, or by the Legislature, and such allegiance
as a state corporation owes to its creator. The mere grant of privileges
or powers to an existing corporation, without more, does not do this,
and does not make it a citizen of the state conferring such power. ' '2
The effect of a consolidation of several corporations created by the
laws of particular jurisdictions is to create a single corporation and
to dissolve the companies out of which this corporation was formed.30
The effect of consolidating corporations of different states is not to
create a single corporation in all the states, but to create a corporation
in each of the states under whose laws the corporation is formed. For
practical purposes the corporations may be under one management, and
may have the same powers and the same stockholders, yet in contemplation of law there will be a distinct corporation in each creating state.
Therefore, a consolidated corporation, one of the component companies
of which was incorporated under the laws of the state in which suit is
brought against the consolidated company by a citizen of that state, for
purposes of federal jurisdiction will be deemed to be a citizen of that
particular state,31 and when sued as a citizen of one state, the fact that
it is at the same time as citizen of another state is immaterial.3 2 The
27

28

,

30

31

32

See Martin v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 151 U.S. 673, 38 U.S. (L. Ed.) 311;
Morgan v. East Tennessee & V. R. Co. (C.C.) 48 Fed. 705; Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. St. Louis A. & T. H. R. Co., 118 U.S. 290, 30 U.S. (L. Ed.) 83.
Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581, 27 U.S. (L. Ed.) 518;
Uphoff v. Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R. Co. (C. C.) 5 Fed. 545; Missouri Pac.
R. Co. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753, 30 L.R.A. 250.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 118 U.S. 290, 30 U.S.
(L. Ed.) 83. But see St. Joseph, etc. R. Co. v. Steele, 167 U.S. 659, 42 U.S.
(L. Ed.) 315; Southern R. Co. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326, 47 U.S. (L. Ed.)
1078; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541, 56 U.S. (L. Ed.) 875.
Atlantic & Gulf R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U.S. 359, 25 U.S. (L. Ed.) 185;
McMahon v. Morrison, 16 Ind. 79 Am. Dec. 418; People ex rel. Shipton v.
Dunleith & Dubuque Bridge Co., 322 Ill. 99, 152 N.E. 526; People v. New
York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 129 N.Y. 474, 29 N.E. 959, 15 L.R.A. 82.
Case v. Atlanta & C. A. R. Co., 225 Fed. 862; Baldwin v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co., 86 Fed. 167; Goodwin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 124 Fed.
358.
Georgia S. etc., R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust. etc. Co., 94 Ga. 306, 21 S.E. 701;
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753, 32 U.S. App. 691, 30 L.R.A. 250.
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same principle applies here which applies to suits against a corporation
created by different states though not by consolidation. 33 The supreme
court of Illinois, in determining the status of the consolidated corporation, said: "The new corporation will * * * become vested with the
rights and privileges which the original companies had previously
possessed under their respective charters. * * * The new company
stood in each state as the original company had previously stood in that
state, invested with the same rights and subject to the same liabilities.
Unlike a corporation created by a single state, which cannot migrate
or legally exist outside of the territorial limits of the state of its creation, the consolidated corporation, having a capital stock which is a
unit, and only one set of stockholders who have an interest, by virtue
of their ownership of shares of such stock, in all of its property everywhere, and a single board of directors, will have its domicile in each
state, and the stockholders, directors and officers can, in the absence
of any statutory provision to the contrary, hold meetings and transact
corporate business in either of the states, though in its relation to either
state the consolidated company will be a separate corporation, governed
by the laws of that state." * * *34 But a citizen of state A may use a
consolidated corporation in the federal court of the state in which one
of the component part of the consolidated corporation was incorporated, even though a component company was incorporated in the
state of the plaintiff. 35 And likewise, of course, a consolidated corporation may sue in the federal courts a citizen of the state in which one
of its component parts has been chartered. 36
"The law upon this subject appears to be this: that the fact that
there are railroad corporations created by different states, which have
been consolidated under the laws of those states, and the railroad
operated by virtue of that consolidation as one entire line of road,
will not prevent the corporation from being sued in one of those
states as a corporation created by the laws of that state, provided.the
plaintiff is a citizen of a state other than that of the state which creates
the corporation. The only law that operates upon it is the law of its
own state. * * * If the defendant corporation, though consolidated
with another of a different state, can be sued in the federal court,
33 Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286, 17 U.S. (L. Ed.) 130, M\emphis,
etc. R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581, 27 U.S. (L. Ed.) 518.
34 Graham v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co., 118 U.S. 161, 30 U.S. (L. Ed.) 196. See
also Minot v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. 18 Wall.
206; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. People, 123 Ill.
467, 14 N.E. 874.
83Williamson v. Krohn, 66 Fed. 655; Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 24 U.S.
(L. Ed.) 207.
36 Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. R. Corp, 136 U.S. 356, 34 (L.Ed.) 363.
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in the state of its creation, as a citizen thereof, why can it not sue as
a citizen of the state which created it? I can see no difference in the
principle. It seems to me that when the plaintiff comes into the federal
court, if a corporation of another state, it is clothed with all the
attributes of citizenship which the laws of that state confer, and the
shareholders of that corporation must be conclusively regarded as citizens of the state which created the corporation, precisely the same as
37
if it were a defendant.
As one looks back over the line of decisions beginning with the
early case of Bank v. Deveaux and follows the decisions through to
the celebrated case of Patch v. Wabash R. R. Co., it is clear that corporations have been given, if not the substance, at least the form, of
citizenship. Absurdity after absurdity has followed in the wake of each
decision, until the point has finally been reached, following the reasoning of indisputable presumption that the members of a corporation are
citizens of the incorporating state, where the stockholders of a corporation of one state later made a corporation of a second state, would be
first the citizens of one state and then of another state. In the case of
Patch v. Wabash R. Co., it was held that although the corporation was
created by the consolidation of corporations of Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio, that the railroad company when sued in
Illinois was for the purpose of jurisdiction a citizen of that state. The
rules reached and the reasoning used in reaching the decisions are
seemingly artificial. How can it be said that in the furtherance of the
business of the consolidated corporation, corporation A in state A is
taking no part in the business of corporation B in state B, especially
where all of the component part of the consolidated corporation are
managed and controlled by the same board of directors? Does not the
company make single contracts for the entire concern?
Although mention has been made in the beginning of this article to
the proposed Norris bill abolishing the diversity of citizenship, this
article holds no brief for or against either side of the issue; the only
object is to point out an anomalous situation which has developed what
appears to be a laissez-faire process of reasoning by the Supreme
Court. It would seem that the anomaly has been largely due to the
extremely rapid development of consolidated corporations coupled with
the absence of legislation defining the limits on the actions of such
corporations. It is likely that the next decade will see the enactment
of legislation by the states and by Congress which will be precise
enough to permit the Supreme Court to take a realistic view of corporation citizenship.
3 St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Indianapolis, St. L. R. Co. 9 Biss. 144, Fed.
Cas. No. 12,237.

